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Amidst the often disappointingly vacuous cacophony over Indiana’s recently passed RFRA legislation,
Jacob Levy, a political philosopher at McGill, raised the fascinating question of how we ought to think about
the relationship between religious freedom and commerce.
Levy raises two sets of concerns with Indiana’s law, one of which is largely illusory and one of which merits
serious thought. The illusory concern is that the Indiana RFRA is a radical innovation that by applying the
compelling state interest test to private causes of action threatens to undermine the basic legal infrastructure
– property, contract, and tort – of the market.
It’s important to remember that we have decades of experience applying some version of the compelling state
interest test to religious claims. We have the nearly three decades from Sherbert to Smith as a matter of
constitutional law, and then the more than two decades from the passage of RFRA to the present as a matter
of federal statutory law. Beginning in the mid1990s some states began passing their own RFRAs, and
during this entire period numerous states applied some version of the compelling state interest test as a
matter of state constitutional law. If antinomian chaos were going to break forth one would think that after a
half century it already would have happened.
In terms of concrete conflicts between RFRAs and basic private law, it seems to me that the most dangerous
ones would be cases involving bodily harm or the invasion or destruction of property. I think that in cases
involving bodily integrity, courts would have no problem saying that the state had a compelling government
interest in protecting bodily integrity and in providing recourse to those suffering bodily injury. I think that
for most property cases, we can dispose of them by saying that property law places no substantial burden on
religious exercise. Saying that you have to build your sukkah on in your yard rather than my yard is not a
substantial burden. There might be issues if we have a property owner who for some reason owned religiously
significant land, as has been the case with some Native American claims against the federal government.
Depending on the facts, I am not convinced that chaos would result if we granted an exemption from certain
rules of property law. To give an analogy, lots of private property owners have land that contains graves. In
many states there is a common law doctrine granting descendants an easement on the land to visit the
graves. The market has not been threatened.
His rather fanciful legal concerns aside, however, Levy raises a deeper issue, one that deserve far more
attention that it has received. His concern is with the way in which allowing religious believers to claim
exemptions from otherwise applicable laws might inject the question of religious identity into commerce. He
quotes Voltaire’s famous statement of the doux commerce argument:
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Take a view of the Royal Exchange in London, a place more venerable than many courts of
justice, where the representatives of all nations meet for the benefit of mankind. There the Jew,
the Mahometan, and the Christian transact together, as though they all professed the same
religion, and give the name of infidel to none but bankrupts. There thee Presbyterian confides in
the Anabaptist, and the Churchman depends on the Quaker’s word. At the breaking up of this
pacific and free assembly, some withdraw to the synagogue, and others to take a glass. This
man goes and is baptized in a great tub, in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost: that
man has his son’s foreskin cut off, whilst a set of Hebrew words (quite unintelligible to him) are
mumbled over his child. Others retire to their churches, and there wait for the inspiration of
heaven with their hats on, and all are satisfied.
Voltaire’s insight – one he shared with thinkers such as Montesquieu and Adam Smith – was that markets
are more than simply a mechanism for organizing economic production. They are also moral and political
institutions that structure relationships and inculcate certain moral habits. For the eighteenthcentury
apologists for commerce, the effect of markets in this area was largely beneficent. They allowed those of very
differing religious convictions to peacefully cooperate and tended to inculcate habits of tolerance and, if not
respect, at least peaceful coexistence.
Levy suggests that by allowing religious people to claim exemptions from the demands of contract or
property, RFRA statutes might undermine this order. As explained above, I think that this is the wrong
thing to worry about. The scope of antidiscrimination laws, however, does raise this issue. As near as I can
tell, Levy himself favors rather narrow antidiscrimination laws on largely libertarian grounds. What
happens, however, when we apply the doux commerce argument itself to the question of antidiscrimination
laws?
Normally we think of contract as structuring relationships in the market. Antidiscrimination laws, however,
deprive certain market participants of the ability to avoid contracting. This raises two questions. First, does
such forced contracting undermine doux commerce by replacing contractual norms with noncontractual
equality norms, or does it enhance doux commerce by requiring people to trade across tribal and religious
boundaries? Second, when thinking about religion in our society, how desirable is the Royal Exchange of
Voltaire? On one hand it tends to promote tolerance and peacefully mediate religious pluralism. At the end
of the day, however, Voltaire was no great friend of religious faith and for him one of the great attractions of
commerce was the corrosive effect he hoped that it would have on religious communities, which he wished to
see submerged in the universal, secular identity of citizenship.
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